



Toulouse
School of
Economics



IAST

Toulouse Summer School in Quantitative Social Sciences

May 30 - June 23, 2023 - TOULOUSE

May 30/June 9 - Part 1
*The evolution of
human sociality*

June 12/June 23 - Part 2
*Economic and
political
institutions*

Economics
+
Social
Sciences



A program in the social and behavioral sciences

In pursuit of the common good

The Toulouse Summer School in Quantitative Social Sciences at Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST) offers an interdisciplinary program in the social and behavioral sciences. The summer school is open to PhD students in economics and other disciplines.

Applicants should provide a CV, a copy of their most advanced degree, a proof of student status, a short cover letter and a recommendation letter (optional) on the online application form. Applicants should specify if they will attend part 1, part 2, or both.

Credits: 3 ECTS credits per part.

Fees: 275€ for the whole program.

Waiver and funding: All students will be provided with university accommodation on site throughout the length of the program they are registered for. PhD students *in other disciplines than economics* will further have their registration fees waived and their travel expenses funded.

Application deadline: February 10, 2023

Location: Classes will be *in-presence only* and located in the new TSE building at 1 Esplanade de l'Université, 31000, Toulouse, France.

Program:

PART 1 - May 30 > June 9 - **The evolution of human sociality**

PART 2 - June 12 > June 23 - **Economic and political institutions**

Online application platform: www.tse-fr.eu/toulouse-summer-school-quantitative-social-sciences

Contact: summerschool@tse-fr.eu

Organizers: Victor Gay (victor.gay@tse-fr.eu) and Jonathan Stieglitz (jonathan.stieglitz@iast.fr)

Part 1 *(May 30 ▶ June 9, 2023)*

The evolution of human sociality

Overview

Evolutionary theory provides a powerful organizing conceptual framework for understanding human social behavior that spans academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, biology, economics and psychology), levels of explanation (e.g., proximate, ultimate, developmental, and phylogenetic) and levels of social organization (dyads, families, communities, and beyond). In so doing, this framework helps explain variation in human sociality across space and time.

This first part of the summer school will provide an overview of evolutionary approaches to understanding human sociality from an interdisciplinary perspective, incorporating the most recent theoretical and empirical advances. The first week comprises a course by **Dr. Jonathan Stieglitz** on human social evolution from an evolutionary anthropological perspective; during this week students will also have the opportunity to attend the 10th Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop held on Thursday, June 1 and Friday, June 2 (theme: "Inertia in biological and cultural systems").

During the second week, Dr. Stieglitz will complete his course on human social evolution; the second week will also consist of courses offered by **Dr. Péter Bayer** on mathematical models of social evolution; by **Dr. Zoe Purcell** on reasoning in a modern world, with artificial intelligence and rapidly changing information landscapes; by **Dr. Maxime Derex** on the effect of human sociality on cumulative cultural evolution; and by **Dr. Paul Seabright** on the evolution and function of religion. For both weeks, the daily format will consist of lectures (mornings) and student presentations (afternoons).

Instructors



Jonathan Stieglitz is Associate Professor of Anthropology at University of Toulouse 1 Capitole and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. He co-directs the Tsimane Health and Life History Project (<http://tsimane.anth.ucsb.edu/index.html>), a joint health and anthropology project aimed at understanding human life course evolution.

Dr. Stieglitz's research aims to understand how ecological and social factors interact to influence human behavior. Specifically, his research addresses three questions:

- 1) Why do families form and function the way they do?
- 2) How does variability in family functioning affect the well-being of household members?
- 3) Why and how do social relationships (family and other) interact with local ecology to influence behavior over the life course?

To address these questions Dr. Stieglitz uses principles from behavioral ecology and life history theory, which attempt to explain modern human variation as an adaptive response to trade-offs between investments in competing demands. Dr. Stieglitz received his PhD in Anthropology (concentration: Human Evolutionary Ecology) from the University of New Mexico.

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Péter Bayer is a postdoctoral researcher at the Toulouse School of Economics and the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. His broad research interests are in game theory, networks, and the application of game theory to fight cancer. His specific topics of interest are:

- 1) network formation games, particularly understanding the strategic incentives behind forming social ties between individuals;
- 2) games on networks, i.e., how individuals behave in strategic situations in relation to their social networks;
- 3) the evolutionary dynamics between cancer cells – and how to exploit these for treatment.

Dr. Bayer received his PhD at Maastricht University in 2019.

Email: peter.bayer@tse-fr.eu



Maxime Derex is a CNRS researcher at the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. His work is situated at the intersection of evolutionary anthropology and psychology and focuses on understanding how culture evolves. His central research theme concerns understanding the psychological and social processes involved in technology production.

Some of the questions that he is currently exploring include: How do humans manage to transmit and build upon accumulated cultural information? What types of population structures promote the process of collective search? And to what extent do pre-existing solutions constrain the evolution of future technologies?

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Zoe Purcell is postdoctoral researcher at the Artificial and Natural Intelligence Institute of Toulouse and the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. Her current research focuses on how people reason in a modern world.

Her research addresses questions including: How does AI-augmentation of text, voice, and video communication affect our social experience? And how do people form beliefs about climate change in an environment of echo-chambers, political polarization, and misinformation?

Dr. Purcell received her PhD in 2020 in Psychology (concentration: thinking and reasoning) from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia.

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Paul Seabright is Professor of Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics and a member and former director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse.

His current research lies in three areas of microeconomics: industrial organization and competition policy; the economics of networks and the digital society; and behavioral economics (especially the integration of evolutionary biology and anthropology with an understanding of the development of economic institutions in the very long run).

He is the author of *The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life* (Princeton, 2010) and *The Origins of Enchantment: How Religions Compete* (Princeton, forthcoming 2024).

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Course structure, part 1 / week 1

(Tuesday, May 30 – Friday, June 2)

Human social evolution (taught by Jonathan Stieglitz)

Human social behavior has been shaped by evolutionary processes. This course reviews the relevant theory and primary approaches for investigating human social behavior from an evolutionary perspective. We will explore universal and variable features of human sociality across time and space, with a primary focus on subsistence-level populations but also including modern industrialized economies. Topics addressed will include cooperation, mating and parenting, life history theory, norm enforcement, and inequality and competition.

Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop

During this week students will also have the opportunity to attend the 10th Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop held on Thursday, June 1 and Friday, June 2 (theme: “*Inertia in biological and cultural systems*”)

Course structure, part 1 / week 2

(Monday, June 5 – Friday, June 9)

Human social evolution (continued from part 1 / week 1; taught by Jonathan Stieglitz)

Reasoning in a modern world (taught by Zoe Purcell)

The psychology of reasoning examines how slowly evolved human cognition operates in a rapidly evolving information environment. This lecture will be split into two parts. The first will cover research addressing how we reason with and about artificial intelligence. The second will address how we reason and form beliefs in environments dominated by misinformation, and the factors that impact our tendencies to think critically and update our beliefs. These lectures explore how theories of human reasoning and empirical techniques from cognitive psychology can be used to address current global issues.

Religion and ideology (taught by Paul Seabright)

In spite of the predictions of some versions of secularization theory, religion in the modern world shows no signs of decline: falling religiosity in some parts of Europe and North America is offset by high and stable or increasing religiosity in the rest of the world. These two lectures will discuss how modern organizational skills have enabled religious organizations to respond to the needs of their members. They will introduce the notion of religious organizations as platforms that create communities of users, and consider the different components of the services these platforms offer, distinguishing secular services like health and education from the ritual and ideological components of religious activity. They will conclude by showing how religious organizations have become effective vectors of moral and ideological ideas because of the success of their underlying economic model.

The effects of human sociality on cumulative cultural evolution (taught by Maxime Derex)

Our species’ ecological success is supported by our ability to selectively learn beneficial social information, resulting in the accumulation of innovations over time. Compared with non-human primates, humans live in large networks of unrelated individuals that might be conducive to the accumulation of cultural innovations. In this course, we 1) introduce students to empirical and theoretical studies that highlight how both population size and structure can shape the pool of cultural information that individuals can build upon to innovate, 2) review the potential pathways through which humans’ unique social structure might promote cumulative cultural evolution, and 3) discuss whether humans’ social networks might partly result from selection pressures linked to our extensive reliance on culturally accumulated knowledge.

Mathematical models of social evolution (taught by Péter Bayer)

Social evolution is the subfield of the evolutionary sciences concerned with the evolution (be it genetic or cultural) of social behaviors, that is, behaviors having fitness consequences for individuals other than the actor. Although most research in the evolutionary (human) sciences is empirical, predictions and intuitions are often derived from mathematical models drawing upon evolutionary theory and game theory. In this course, we introduce students to ideas and models used in social evolution theory and apply them to the general question of the evolution of human cooperation. In particular, we will review models of indirect reciprocity and institutional sanctioning.

week 1

	Monday, May 29	Tuesday, May 30 Jonathan Stieglitz	Wednesday, May 31 Jonathan Stieglitz	Thursday, June 1	Friday, June 2
9:00 - 10:30	Pentecost holiday	Overview of human evolutionary social sciences	Life History Theory I	Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop	Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop
10:30 - 11:00		Break	Break		
11:00 - 12:30		Social contract theory in light of evolutionary social science	Life History Theory II		
12:30 - 14:00		Lunch	Lunch		
14:00 - 17:00		Student presentations	Student presentations		

week 2

	Monday, June 5 Jonathan Stieglitz	Tuesday, June 6 Zoe Purcell	Wednesday, June 7 Paul Seabright	Thursday, June 8 Maxime Derex	Friday, June 9 Péter Bayer
9:00 - 10:30	Norm enforcement	Reasoning and artificial intelligence	The economic strength of religion in the modern world	The effects of population size and structure on cumulative cultural evolution	Introduction to mathematical models of social evolution
10:30 - 11:00	Break	Break	Break	Break	Break
11:00 - 12:30	Complementarity in human families	Belief updating and misinformation	Religious organizations: business models and impact on beliefs	Are human population structures especially conducive to cumulative cultural evolution?	Indirect reciprocity and institutional sanctioning
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch
14:00 - 17:00	Student presentations	Student presentations	Student presentations	Student presentations	Student presentations

Evaluation

Students will be evaluated based on written assignments (which may be composed of material from the lectures, readings and/or from the two-day workshop on Economics and Biology), class presentations, and overall participation.

References

Human social organization

- Boehm, C. (1999). *Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior*. Harvard University Press.
- Boone, J. (1992). Competition, Conflict, and the Development of Social Hierarchies. In *Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior* (Smith, E. A., & Winterhalder, B. Eds), 301–337. Aldine de Gruyter.
- Kaplan, H. S., Hooper, P. L., & Gurven, M. (2009). The Evolutionary and Ecological Roots of Human Social Organization. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 364(1533), 3289–3299.
- Summers, K. (2005). The Evolutionary Ecology of Despotism. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 26(1), 106–135.

Food sharing

- Gurven, M. (2004). To Give and to Give Not: The Behavioral Ecology of Human Food Transfers. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 27(4), 543–559
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- Wood, B. M., & Marlowe, F. W. (2013). Household and Kin Provisioning by Hadza Men. *Human Nature*, 24(3), 280–317.

Life history theory

- Thompson E. M., et al. (2007). Aging and Fertility Patterns in Wild Chimpanzees Provide Insights Into the Evolution of Menopause. *Current Biology*, 17(24), 2150–2156.
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- Hill, K., Barton, M., & Hurtado, A. M. (2009). The Emergence of Human Uniqueness: Characters Underlying Behavioral Modernity. *Evolutionary Anthropology*, 18(5), 187–200.
- Hill, K., & Kaplan, H. (1999). Life History Traits in Humans: Theory and Empirical Studies. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 28(1), 397–430.
- Kaplan H. (1997). The Evolution of the Human Life Course. In *Between Zeus and the Salmon: The Biodemography of Aging* (Wachter, K, & Finch, C., Eds), 175–211. *National Academy of Sciences*.

Cumulative culture and population structure

- Derex, M. & Mesoudi, A. (2020). Cumulative Cultural Evolution within Evolving Population Structures. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* 24, 654–667, doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.04.005.
- Hill, K. R., Wood, B. M., Baggio, J., Hurtado, A. M. & Boyd, R. T. (2014). Hunter-Gatherer Inter-Band Interaction Rates: Implications for Cumulative Culture. *PLoS One* 9, e102806, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102806.
- Migliano, A. B. et al. (2020). Hunter-gatherer multilevel sociality accelerates cumulative cultural evolution. *Science Advances* 6, eaax5913, doi:10.1126/sciadv.aax5913.
- Smolla, M. & Akçay, E. (2019). Cultural selection shapes network structure. *Science Advances* 5, eaaw0609, doi:10.1126/sciadv.aaw0609.

Mathematical models of social evolution

- McElreath, R. and Boyd, R., (2008). *Mathematical models of social evolution: A guide for the perplexed*. University of Chicago Press.
- Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J., (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. *Ethology and sociobiology*, 13(3), pp.171–195.
- Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J., (1989). The evolution of indirect reciprocity. *Social networks*, 11(3), pp.213–236.

Reasoning in a modern world

- Bonnefon, J.-F., Shariff, A., & Rahwan, I. (2016). The social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. *Science*, 352(6293), 1573–1576.
- Bago, B., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2020). Fake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 149, 1608–1613.
- Purcell, Z. A., Wastell, C. A., & Sweller, N. (in press). Eye movements reveal that low confidence precedes deliberation. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*.

Religion and ideology

- Barro, R. and R. McCleary (2019), *The Wealth of Religions: the Political Economy of Believing and Belonging*, Princeton University Press.
- Carvalho, Jean-Paul and Sacks, Michael (2021), “The economics of religious communities”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 201, 104481
- Dunbar, Robin (2022) *How Religion Evolved - And Why It Endures*, Penguin Books.
- Iyer, S. (2016) “The New Economics of Religion”, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 54(2), 395–441.



Part 2 *(June 12 ▶ June 23, 2023)*

Economic and political institutions

Overview

The second part of the Summer School will introduce students to a wide range of topics and issues in political economy. In particular, we will discuss the roots of electoral preferences and behavior, of protests and social mobilization, and of political prejudice and polarization. We will also provide theoretical tools to students to think about elections, the origin of democracy, and the political economy of the mass media. Finally, we will also discuss the roots and solutions to the problem of corruption and development.



Instructors

Mateo Montenegro is an Assistant Professor at the Toulouse School of Economics. In his research he studies the interrelation between the political economy and development of countries using empirical methods. He completed his Ph.D. at MIT in 2020, after which he was a Postdoctoral Researcher at CEMFI and a Labor Economist at the OECD. His work has been published in the American Economic Review.



Alberto Simpser is a Professor of Political Science at ITAM. His research studies major issues in the political economy of development, including corruption, electoral manipulation, governance, and democratic accountability. He utilizes statistical, experimental, formal, and qualitative methods. Before joining ITAM in his native Mexico City, Alberto was Assistant Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He has been a residential Fellow at the Princeton Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance and a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He holds a PhD in political science and an MA in economics from Stanford University, and a B.Sc. in engineering sciences from Harvard College.



Patrick Le Bihan is assistant professor of political science at CEVIPOF-Sciences Po. After a French-German dual degree in social sciences awarded by Sciences Po and the Free University Berlin, he received his PhD in political science from New York University. Prior to joining Sciences Po, he was a research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. His research focuses on how various political institutions affect the ability of the electorate to hold elected officials accountable and how the functioning of these institutions ultimately rests on the incentives provided by elections. His work has been published in The Journal of Politics, Political Science Research and Methods, and The Quarterly Journal of Political Science.



Christophe Lévêque is a researcher in Economics and Political Science and a teacher at Université de Bordeaux. He holds a Ph.D in Economics from the Toulouse School of Economics. He continued his research with a postdoc at IPerG where he worked on the project led by Carles Boix The Birth of Party Democracy. The Emergence of Mass Parties and the Choice of Electoral Laws in Europe and North America (1870-1940). He now works in the GREThA at the Université de Bordeaux. His primary fields of interests lie in political economy, urban economics, and economic history.

Course structure, part 2

(Monday, June 12 – Friday, June 23)

week 3

	Monday, June 12 Alberto Simpser	Tuesday, June 13 Alberto Simpser	Wednesday, June 14 Alberto Simpser	Thursday, June 15 Patrick Le Bihan	Friday, June 16 Patrick Le Bihan
9:00 - 11:30 MORNING LECTURE	Electoral preferences and behavior	Non-electoral participation: protests and social mobilization	Prejudice, polarization, and interventions to reduce them	How to think about elections	Political Economy of Mass Media
14:00 - 16:00 AFTERNOON STUDENT PRESENTATIONS	<i>Instructors:</i> Alberto Simpser and Sebastian Thieme	<i>Instructors:</i> Alberto Simpser and Michele Rosenberg	<i>Instructors:</i> Alberto Simpser and Sebastian Thieme	<i>Instructors:</i> Patrick Le Bihan and Sebastian Thieme	<i>Instructors:</i> Patrick Le Bihan and Michele Rosenberg

week 4

	Monday, June 19 Mateo Montenegro	Tuesday, June 20 Mateo Montenegro	Wednesday, June 21 Christophe Lévêque	Thursday, June 22 Christophe Lévêque	Friday, June 23 Mateo Montenegro
9:00 - 11:30 MORNING LECTURE	Corruption and Development: The Consequences	Corruption and Development: The Causes	The origin of democracy	Family and politics	Corruption and Development: The Fight Against Corruption
14:00 - 16:00 AFTERNOON STUDENT PRESENTATIONS	<i>Instructors:</i> Mateo Montenegro and Michael Denly	<i>Instructors:</i> Mateo Montenegro and Michael Denly	<i>Instructors:</i> Karine Van Der Straeten and Christophe Lévêque	<i>Instructors:</i> Karine Van Der Straeten and Christophe Lévêque	<i>Instructors:</i> Mateo Montenegro and Anne Degrave



Course structure, part 2 / week 3

(Monday, June 12 – Friday, June 16)

Program

Monday June 12: Electoral preferences and behavior (Alberto Simpser)

In electoral systems, voting is likely the single most important form of political behavior for ordinary citizens. What are the reasons that people sympathize with some political parties but not with others, vote for some parties and not for others, and turn out to vote or stay at home on election day? What are the causes of persistence and change in basic political preferences and behaviors? We will selectively survey classical and modern approaches to these questions.

References

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- Riker, William and Peter Ordeshook. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American Political Science Review*
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- Billings et al. 2021. "The long run effects of school racial diversity on political identity." *American Economic Review Insights*
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- DellaVigna, Stefano, John A. List, Ulrike Malmendier, and Gautam Rao. 2016. "Voting to Tell Others." *Review of Economic Studies* 84 (1): 143-81
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- Pons, Vincent. 2018. "Will a Five-Minute Discussion Change Your Mind? A Countrywide Experiment on Voter Choice in France." *American Economic Review*
- Kalla, Joshua L., and David E. Broockman. 2018. "The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 112 (1): 148-66
- Dinas, Elias. 2014. "Does Choice Bring Loyalty? Electoral Participation and the Development of Party Identification." *Journal of Politics*
- Fujiwara, Thomas et al. 2016. "Habit Formation in Voting: Evidence from Rainy Elections". *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*

Tuesday June 13: Non-electoral participation: protests and social mobilization (Alberto Simpser)

In electoral and non-electoral systems alike, people can participate by protesting and mobilizing. What factors lead individuals to join a protest? What are the informational and psychological factors driving participation in social mobilizations? Does leadership matter? Are revolutions predictable?

References

- Kuran, Timur. 1989. "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution." *Public Choice*
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. "The dynamics of informational cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." *World Politics*
- Meyer, David. 2004. "Protests and political opportunities." *Annual Review of Sociology*
- Cantoni, Davide, David Y Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Y Jane Zhang. 2019. "Protests as strategic games: experimental evidence from Hong Kong's antiauthoritarian movement." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2): 1021–1077.
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- Dippel and Heblich. 2021. "Leadership in Social Movements: Evidence from the Forty-Eighters in the Civil War." *American Economic Review*
- Enikolopov, Ruben, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova. 2020. "Social media and protest participation: Evidence from Russia." *Econometrica*
- Steinert-Threlkeld, 2017. "Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization During the Arab Spring." *American Political Science Review*
- Wilkinson, 2009. "Riots." *Annual Review of Political Science*



Course structure, part 2 / week 3

(Monday, June 12 – Friday, June 16)

Wednesday June 14: Prejudice, polarization, and interventions to reduce them (Alberto Simpser)

Partisan prejudice and polarization appear to be on the rise in many electoral systems. How is political polarization measured? What are its causes? And what can be done about it? We will review recent studies on affective polarization, polarized behavior, and the effect of intergroup contact on political tolerance.

References

- **Iyengar et al.** 2019. "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States," *Annual Review of Political Science*
- **Druckman et al.** 2020. "Affective polarization, local context, and public opinion in America." *Nature Human Behavior*
- **Allcott et al.** 2020. "Polarization and public health: Partisan differences in social distancing during the coronavirus pandemic." *Journal of Public Economics*
- **Levy, Ro'ee.** 2021. "Social Media, News Consumption, and Polarization: Evidence from a Field Experiment." *American Economic Review*
- **Pettigrew and Tropp.** 2008. "How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators." *European Journal of Social Psychology*
- **Paluck et al.** 2019. "The contact hypothesis reevaluated." *Behavioral Public Policy*
- **Enos, Ryan** 2014. "Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*
- **Broockman and Kalla.** 2016. "Durably reducing transphobia." *Science*
- **Scacco and Warren.** 2018. "Can Social Contact Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria." *American Political Science Review*
- **Mousa, Salma.** 2020. "Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims through soccer in post-ISIS Iraq." *Science*
- **Lowe, Matt.** 2021. "Types of contact: A field experiment on collaborative and adversarial caste integration." *American Economic Review*

Thursday June 15: How to Think about Elections (Patrick Le Bihan)

Elections are the cornerstone of any democratic system. Yet, there is significant debate about what elections are supposed to accomplish. Do they serve as tools for citizens to aggregate preferences or information over policies or do they simply serve as tools to select elected officials and keep them in check? Moreover, how well do elections serve these different functions? Are elections efficient at solving incentive problems? Are more competent politicians elected to office? Whose preferences do elected officials represent?

References

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- **Canes-Wrone et al.** 2001. "Leadership and Pandering". *American Journal of Political Science*
- **Maskin and Tirole.** 2004. "The Politician and the Judge". *American Economic Review*
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- **Little et al.** 2022. "Motivated Reasoning and Democratic Accountability". *American Political Science Review*
- **Pons and Tricaud.** 2018. "Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence from Runoffs with Two or Three Candidates." *Econometrica*
- **McMurray.** 2013. "Aggregating Information by Voting." *Review of Economic Studies*
- **Fujiwara.** 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica*
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- **Alt, J. E., Mesquita, E. B. d., and Rose, S.** 2011. "Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits". *The Journal of Politics*.
- **Ferraz, C. and Finan, F.** 2011. "Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments". *The American Economic Review*

Friday June 16: Political Economy of Mass Media (Patrick Le Bihan)

What is the effect of mass media on politics? What drives media coverage and how does it affect electoral accountability? How do supply and demand drive of media bias? How to measure media bias and which form of media bias impacts accountability? How naïve are voters? And is the media biased? Are some media outlets too powerful and how should the media markets be regulated to ensure fair electoral competition?

References

- **Snyder Jr, J. M. and Strömberg, D.** (2010). "Press coverage and political accountability". *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2)
- **Allcott, H. and Gentzkow, M.** (2017). "Social media and fake news in the 2016 election". *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31(2):211–236
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- **Campante, F. R., Durante, R., and Sobrio, F.** (2017). "Politics 2.0: The Multifaceted Effect of Broadband Internet on Political Participation". *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 62(3):330
- **Allcott, H., Braghieri, L., Eichmeyer, S., and Gentzkow, M.** (2020). "The Welfare Effects of Social Media". *American Economic Review*, 110(3):629–676
- **Guriev, S., Melnikov, N., and Zhuravskaya, E.** (2020). "3G Internet and Confidence in Government". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*



Course structure, part 2 / week 4

(Monday, June 19 – Friday, June 23)

Program

Monday June 19: Corruption and Development: The Consequences (Mateo Montenegro)

Corruption is a mediatic phenomenon that continuously captures people's attention and incites debate. But apart from its salience, is there any reason why economists should pay special attention to it? Does it, somehow, affect economic development and growth? If it does, what are the mechanisms connecting the two phenomena? In this lecture, we study these questions by laying out recent theoretic and empirical advances regarding the consequences of corruption.

References

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Tuesday June 20: Corruption and Development: The Causes (Mateo Montenegro)

Cross-country comparisons suggest that corruption levels are not homogeneous across the world. They are omnipresent in many countries and virtually absent in others. What are the fundamental causes of these differences? What determines the persistence of corruption? What implications does this have for the potential ways to reduce corruption? In this second lecture about corruption and development we study recent theory and evidence about these questions, by focusing on culture and institutions as the fundamental causes of corruption.

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Wednesday June 21: The origin of democracy (Christophe Lévêque)

Why some countries are democracies? Why other are not? This question is likely one of the most debated in political economy and political sciences. The objective of this session is to present this literature and some of its recent development. Among others, we will ask whether the following factors explain democratization: Culture and norms, Income and economic development; Critical junctures; Divisions within the elite groups.

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Thursday June 22: Family and politics (Christophe Lévêque)

Family is a central institution in (almost) all societies. In democracies and republican regime, family is supposed to be independent from politics or, at least, it should play no role in the access to political offices nor on the policies that are implemented. Casual observation of the real world reveal this is not the case: politicians sometimes distort policies in order to advantage their relatives and the phenomena of political dynasties (e.g. the Bush, the Kennedy, the Le Pen, the Nehru, the Marcos, etc.) suggests that lineage affects who govern. This session opens a discussion on the role of family in politics within democratic regime. The focus of the session is political dynasties but it will also (briefly) mention related topics such as “political connections and favoritism” and “familism and entry cost in an election”.

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Friday June 23: Corruption and Development: The Fight Against Corruption (Christophe Lévêque)

In the second lecture of this series we reviewed the “fundamental” causes of corruption, such as culture and institutions. Changing these underlying causes requires large scale reform which, in most settings, is practically unfeasible. Is there a point in, instead, thinking about micro interventions to reduce particular types of corruption? In this last lecture we first review some literature about the incentives that bureaucrats face, how interventions can be designed to reduce their involvement corruption, and then move on to review recent evidence that suggest that this is easier said than done.

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